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Abstract 
This analysis focuses on the challenges the EU sovereign debt programmes raise for our understanding 
of legality in the EU by developing in particular the idea of liminal legality. Liminal legality, in the 
sense I develop it here, concerns legal issues awaiting legal location within one or more legal orders. I 
consider how long, and through which kinds of practices, do EU institutions allow unresolved legal 
spaces in the sovereign debt programmes to endure or re-emerge. This entails assessing the various EU 
judicial pathways through which sovereign debt programmes have been challenged. By stressing the 
temporal dimensions of liminal legality and the importance of viewing law as a practical enterprise, my 
analysis suggests that a narrowly doctrinal approach to recent cases such as Ledra Advertising, Mallis 
and Florescu does not capture the problematic dimensions of legality in the EU sovereign debt 
programmes. 
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  1 
And when the Foreign Office find a Treaty's gone astray, 
Or the Admiralty lose some plans and drawings by the way, 
There may be a scrap of paper in the hall or on the stair— 
But it's useless to investigate—Macavity's not there! 
And when the loss has been disclosed, the Secret Service say: 
‘It must have been Macavity!’—but he's a mile away. 
You'll be sure to find him resting, or a-licking of his thumb; 
Or engaged in doing complicated long division sums. 
T.S. Eliot, Macavity the Mystery Cat 
 
Introducing the EU’s sovereign debt decade* 
Sovereign debt loan arrangements constitute a distinctive and prominent mode of EU activity over the 
last decade. They are distinctive because EU law typically operates by setting standards to be applied 
across Member States or to categories of individuals across Member States (eg dairy farmers).  EU 
sovereign debt programmes instead operate by setting out detailed and distinctive arrangements aimed 
at one Member State. While this is mirrored in EMU in the country-specific recommendations under the 
European Semester, the normativity (requirements for states as opposed to recommendations for states) 
differs. It is a new and distinctive area of EU law. Sovereign debt programmes are also a prominent 
feature of the EU landscape over the last decade. There have been ten sovereign debt programmes (not 
including the very substantial financial sector assistance granted to Spain under the European Stability 
Mechanism) since 2008. Overall EU institutions have been involved in the disbursement of around 500 
billion euros (when the EU’s annual budget currently sits at around 140 billion euros or 1% EU-28 GNI). 
While in a programme, many central choices normally reserved to the state, especially those concerning 
the organisation and funding of its public sector and its welfare state, become governed by detailed loan 
conditions and intensive EU institutional oversight and surveillance. The primary location of these 
conditions is the MoU, the Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the programme state and 
the programme. For someone interested in the law and policy of Social Europe, as I am, these are the 
most significant sources to examine of the last decade. The kind of medicine your GP can prescribe, 
how much you will be paid as a civil servant, the level of the minimum wage or your pension, the 
organisation of collective bargaining: all these are matters often covered in detail and often over 
significant periods of time by programme requirements. These conditions create tensions with 
fundamental and human rights. 
This analysis focuses on the challenges the programmes raise for our understanding of legality in the 
EU by developing in particular the idea of liminal legality. To give the context for the challenges for 
legality, we need first to go back to the EU’s capacity to grant sovereign debt loan assistance. From a 
legal point of view the EU was unprepared for sovereign debt crisis. The Treaties provided the 
possibility to offer balance of payments assistance under Article 143 TFEU1; before the sovereign debt 
                                                     
*  Forthcoming in Current Legal Problems (OUP, 2017). I am very grateful to all those who asked me great questions at the 
Current Legal Problems lecture delivered at UCL in May 2017 and also to the many EUI Law Department colleagues who 
provided insights and helpful suggestions on a written version at a Faculty Seminar in June 2017. An early version of this 
paper was delivered at the University of Padua in April 2017 and I thank the organizers of the conference for the opportunity 
to try out my thoughts. The text was finalised in early July 2017. 
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2007] OJ C 115/47 (TFEU). Prior to EMU, all states had potential 
access to Community law balance of payments loan assistance under a 1988 Regulation and Article 108 of the Rome Treaty 
(now Article 143 TFEU): Council Regulation 1969/88 establishing a single facility providing medium-term financial 
assistance for Member States' balances of payments. This replaced earlier mechanisms dating from 1971 whereby 
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crisis, in 2002 it had introduced a new Regulation scaling back the amount of money available on the 
basis that less was needed. 2 So what did it do? For non-euro states, the first to go into programmes, it 
increased five-fold the amount available under the existing EU mechanism.3 For euro states, the crucial 
moment is May 2010. The first state to receive assistance, Greece, had its first programme, of 80 billion 
euros, funded by pooled bilateral loans from euro states. In a flurry of activity the EU looked for ways 
to create other loan assistance mechanisms.  It used Article 122(2) TFEU4 to create the EFSM (the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism) but the amount available was limited by what was available 
in the EU budget, around 60 billion euros, less than what had just been lent to Greece. So at the same 
time it created the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) by immediately effective international 
agreement between the euro area states with an initial funding capacity of over 400 billion euros. In 
Autumn 2010 the euro area states decided to create a permanent stability mechanism, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), and following negotiations on its content, it was set up as an international 
organization between euro area states in 2012. 
This then is the legal backdrop against which we can look at the ten sovereign debt programmes 
that have operated to date. One set of programmes are wholly or partly based in EU law. This 
includes the three non-euro states, wholly EU-law based, and Ireland and Portugal with equal 
funding from the EU based EFSM and the temporary international facility the EFSF set up in 
2010. 
Table 1. EU-based programmes 
 
State Period From EU states 
(EUR billion) 
Legal Basis 
EU only or EU and EFSF (international) 
Hungary Nov 2008-Nov 2009 5.5 EU 
Article 143 TFEU-balance of payments assistance to non 
euro states                                                          Reg 332/2002  
Decision 2009/103/EC providing Community medium-term  
financial assistance for Hungary 
Latvia Jan 2009-Jan 2011 2.9 EU (balance of payments) 
                                                     
Member States granted assistance to each other under Community law Decisions which were renewed every few 
years alongside a Community loan mechanism. 
2 Council Regulation (EC)  332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial 
assistance for Member States' balances of payments [2002] OJ L 53/1 was introduced specifically to respond to the 
small number of beneficiary states following the introduction of the single currency as Recitals (7) and (8) explain: ‘(7) 
Since 1 January 1999 the Member States participating in the single currency no longer qualify for medium-term financial 
assistance. However, the financial assistance facility should be retained in order to meet not only the potential needs of the 
present Member States which have not adopted the euro but also the needs of new Member States until such time as they 
adopt the euro. (8) The introduction of the single currency has led to a substantial reduction in the number of Member 
States eligible for the instrument. A downwards revision of the present ceiling of EUR 16 billion is therefore justified. The 
loan ceiling should, though, be kept at a sufficiently high level in order to satisfy properly the simultaneous needs of several 
Member States. A reduction in the loan ceiling from EUR 16 billion to EUR 12 billion seems apt to meet this need and also 
to take account of forthcoming enlargements of the European Union.’  
3 The Regulation was amended (most recently by Council Regulation (EC) 431/2009 of 18 May 2009 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 332/2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances 
of payments [2009] OJ L 128/1) to increase its loan capacity to EUR 50 billion because ‘The scope and intensity of the 
international financial crisis affects the potential demand for Community medium-term financial assistance in the Member 
States outside the euro area and calls for a significant raising of the ceiling for the outstanding amount of loans to be granted 
to Member States’.  
4 ‘Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain 
conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the 
European Parliament of the decision taken.’ 
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Romania May 2009-June 2011 5 EU (balance of payments) 
Ireland Nov 2010-Dec 2013 67.5 EU and international 
EFSM and EFSF  
Portugal May 2011-May 2014 78 EU and international 
EFSM and EFSF 
Greece 
bridging 
loan 
July 2015 7 EU 
EFSM, Council Implementing Decision of 17 July 2015  
on granting short-term financial assistance to Greece.  
The second set of programmes are those based on different kinds of international agreements between 
the euro area states. These are the basis for Greece’s three main programmes and that of Cyprus. 
 
Table 2. The euro area based programmes 
 
State Period From EU 
states (EUR 
billion) 
Legal basis 
Greece I May 2010-Mar 2012 
(scheduled until 2014) 
80 Pooled bilateral agreements with other euro area states (Greek 
Loan Facility) 
Greece II Mar 2012 –until end 
June 2015 (scheduled 
until end 2014, extended 
when Syriza elected Jan 
2015) 
145 EFSF  
Cyprus May 2013-Mar 2016 9 (70% 
disbursed) 
ESM  
Greece III Aug 2015-Aug 2018 85 ESM 
Liminal legality 
From this starting point I suggest that the programmes are a challenge for EU law and legal scholars 
because they present features of what I term liminal legality. Liminal has got two linked meanings, both 
of which resonate here. A first is occupying a position at, or on both sides of, a boundary or threshold. 
A second is relating to a transitional or initial stage of a process. Liminal legality, in the sense I develop 
it here, accordingly concerns legal issues awaiting legal location within one or more legal orders. 5 
Boundaries of law and legal orders  
Connecting to the first definition, elements of the programmes exist in unresolved legal spaces. In this 
respect, liminal legality exhibits itself in two ways in the sovereign debt programmes. Some parts of the 
programmes exist in a contested border zone between law and non-law. And the most important 
programmes, in terms of scale and length, exist in an unclear zone between EU law and non-EU law.  
                                                     
5 This captures more accurately the features that are problematic in sovereign debt legality than other possible candidates such 
as delegalisation or a-legality. Delegalisation, as used by Joerges, fits less well here as the problem is not centrally an 
escape from law or an absence of justiciable legal norms: see Christian Joerges, ‘Constitutionalism and the Law of the 
European Economy’ in Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein, and Christian Joerges (eds), Beyond the Crisis: The Governance 
of Europe's Economic, Political and Legal Transformation (OUP 2015) 216, 225. A-legality, as used by Lindahl, is not 
suitable. A-legality is used to identify legally disruptive behaviour which both makes apparent and at the same time 
questions the decisions and boundaries of an extant legal order: see Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal 
Order and the Politics of A-Legality (OUP 2013).  
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Law or not? 
All the programmes contain two common elements: 
1. A Loan agreement setting out the detailed financial terms 
2. A MoU on the conditions (on typically fiscal consolidation, financial sector reform and structural 
reform) to be met for loan payments to be made. 
The MoU is clearly a central source in programmes as it is that source which contains the detailed 
requirements to, for example, cut public sector pay or health spending or minimum wages or modify 
collective bargaining arrangements. However, it is one that has been and remains elusive. It is physically 
elusive by which I mean the MoU is often difficult to locate and read especially as it is frequently 
amended during the life of the programme. It is also legally elusive as its legal status and authorship are 
often challenging to ascertain and contested. Moreover, its legal status is likely to be different according 
to whether the legal basis of the programme of which it forms part is based on EU law or not. 
EU law or not? 
As noted in the Tables above, there are EU law-based programmes and euro area based programmes 
under international agreement. However, beyond the multiple and somewhat complex programme bases, 
one might well ask whether it is not all rather straightforward, especially now that the ESM is the primary 
basis for ongoing and future programmes. Let me start showing why that is not the case by turning to 
the euro area international programmes, those for Greece and Cyprus. A feature of these programmes is 
that while not fully inside EU law they have never been fully outside it either. 
First, these loan assistance facilities or mechanisms, although based on international agreements 
between euro area states, are deeply connected, indeed would not be needed, without membership of the 
single currency, a core EU policy. And those euro area agreements themselves concern themselves with 
that connection. Hence the ESM Treaty provides in Article 13(3) for MoU consistency with EU 
economic governance sources.6 
Second, each euro area programme is deeply entangled with EU institutions and decision-making. The 
central role of EU institutions especially the European Commission in managing every single bailout, 
whether it has an EU or international law basis, should be underlined. In the Greek and Cypriot bailouts 
the Commission negotiates the MoUs, signs them, monitors compliance with the MoUs to see if loan 
disbursements can be made, and revises the MoU throughout the life of the programme. 7 The Euro-
group, the finance ministers of the euro area states, also plays a central role in these programmes.8 
Third, no euro area programme has ever been created without at the same time creating a parallel EU 
law source. The first are Excessive Deficit decisions addressed to Greece and Cyprus in relation to all 
the programmes. Hence, for example, the Greek Excessive Deficit Decision adopted on 10 May 2010 
repeats some of the MoU content.9 The second is the introduction from 30 May 2013 of the requirement 
                                                     
6 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) [2012], available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/ 
legal-documents/esm-treaty ‘The MoU shall be fully consistent with the measures of economic policy co-ordination 
provided for in the TFEU, in particular with any act of European Union law, including any opinion, warning, 
recommendations or decision addressed to the Member State concerned.’ 
7 See Council Regulation (EU) 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism 
[2010] OJ L 118/1 (EFSF), ESM Article 2(1)(a); Articles 5(6)(g), 13(4) and 13(7). Note that while in the EFSF the EU 
institutions act on behalf of the euro area states, in the ESM the Board of Governors mandates MoU negotiation, signature 
and monitoring by the Commission but itself approves the MoU. 
8 See Article 137 TFEU and Protocol 14. 
9 Excessive Deficit Procedure Decisions under Article 126 and Art 136 TFEU addressed to Greece and Cyprus: Council 
Decision of 10 May 2010 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving 
notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit 
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in Regulation 472/2013, one half of the so-called 2-Pack, that the loan assistance programme, whatever 
its provenance, is to be matched with a Macro-Economic Adjustment Programme, an EU-MAP, under 
EU law.10 
Figure 1. Matrix of Legal Sources 
 
 EU based programmes    Euro area based programmes 
         
Excessive Deficit Decisions 
          MoU 
Commission/ECB/other EU institution 
programme decision-making and 
management 
         
        EU-MAP under 2013 2-Pack 
 
Figure 1 recaps the features requiring legal clarification and constituting this aspect of liminal legality. 
The left shows the EU law based programmes where the main issue is the status of the MoU. The novelty 
or difficulty therefore resides only in the unusual nature of wide scale provision of EU sovereign debt 
assistance, on the one hand, and on the MoU as an unusual feature of the chain of sources on the other.11 
The right shows the euro area agreements based programmes and their potential links with EU law which 
require legal construction and interpretation.  
Liminal legality is a disturbance for EU law. When significant sources are not clearly in or not clearly 
outside a legal order, or their status as law or non-law is and remains unresolved, that is a challenge to 
its rational, coherent and systemic self-understanding and its justification. Neil MacCormick brings out 
this feature well. In a reflection on the usefulness of legal doctrine as an activity of rational 
reconstruction he notes, ‘The usefulness of legal doctrine is as a picture of the actually-ideal order of a 
given law-community, not as a picture of an absolutely-ideal order…Actual decisions do not necessarily 
replicate doctrinal ideal order. But they can, and it is possible to demand that they do. The special gift 
of legal doctrine to politics is that it sustains the possibility of demands for the Rule of Law, for the 
governance of laws rather than that of arbitrary discretion. This depends on the governing law being 
objectively statable, and stated’.12  
 
                                                     
[2010] OJ L 145/6, adopted on the basis of Arts 126(9) and 136 TFEU; Council Decision 2013/236/EU of 25 April 2013 
addressed to Cyprus on specific measures to restore financial stability and sustainable growth [2013] OJ L 141/32, adopted 
on the basis of Art 126(6) and Art 136(1) TFEU.   
10 Regulation (EU) 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L 140/1; Council Implementing Decision 2013/463 of 13 
September 2013 on approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme for Cyprus and repealing Decision 2013/236/EU 
[2013] OJ L250/40; Council Implementing Decision 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic 
adjustment programme of Greece [2015] OJ L 219/12. 
11 This is indubitably the case for the non-euro area programmes. The Portuguese and Irish programmes were based on both 
EU and euro area agreement instruments. Despite doubts expressed by some authors, these programmes had a clear EU 
law basis. Not only is part of the programme underpinned by EU law but the non-EU law part (the EFSF) expressly tied 
itself and made itself subordinate to the EU law sources: see for further references and analysis, Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the 
bailout measures immune to EU Social challenge because they are not EU Law?’ (2014) 10 EuConst 393. 
12 See Neil MacCormick, ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’ in Werner Krawietz, Neil MacCormick and Georg Henrik von 
Wright (eds), Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems. Festschrift for Robert S. 
Summers (Duncker & Humblot 1994) 53-70.   
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Moreover, liminal legality is a distinct further concern in so far as it makes EU fundamental rights 
review out of reach in relation to sources that have been the subject of many findings of non-compliance 
or concern by a range of international human rights bodies. In essence, one must find a path through 
liminal legality as a precondition to being able to make arguments about the applicability and substantive 
protection afforded by EU fundamental rights protection.  
Time matters 
MacCormick draws a helpful distinction between law’s capacity to be objectively statable, on the one 
hand, and its actually being objectively stated on the other.  As noted above, a further meaning of liminal 
is the initial stage of a process which can be equated to law’s capacity to be objectively statable. The 
period elapsing between law’s capacity to being objectively statable and it actually being objectively 
stated deserves identification and analysis. It might be argued that in the early days of the euro area 
crisis, in 2010, solutions had to be patched together with some urgency and little regard for legal clarity 
or fundamental rights compliance. However, over many years and many programmes, the EU 
institutions had the opportunity to address these problems and place the programmes on a clearer legal 
and fundamental rights footing. The Court of Justice of the European Union, both the Court of Justice 
and the General Court, was given multiple opportunities to consider a range of issues related to the legal 
nature and fundamental rights in the programmes. Moreover, as the programmes proceeded, ample 
evidence and findings of their non-compliance or concerns they raised in relation with international 
human rights became clear. Multiple aspects of the programmes were either condemned by or elicited 
strong expressions of concern from, to give just some examples, the European Committee of Social 
Rights,13 the ILO Committees,14 CEDAW,15 and others with special positions from the UN16 and the 
Council of Europe.17 These findings provided clear guidance on the shortfalls of the programmes as well 
as, one might imagine, an impetus for the EU to address those shortfalls. Legal and political analysis 
began to explore and challenge the approaches of the Court of Justice and other EU institutions to 
sovereign debt programmes. The EU legislature and the EU Commission could accordingly make 
proposals and take actions to address liminal legality and fundamental rights shortfalls. Moreover, this 
could in turn limit the space for the Court of Justice to make choices to amplify or rely upon the existence 
of liminal legality in order to place contested elements of programmes outside EU law. We shall see that 
shifts did occur across the board: by the Court of Justice, by the EU legislature and by the EU 
Commission.  
This dimension of liminal legality draws our attention to how long, and through which kinds of practices, 
do EU institutions allow unresolved legal spaces to endure or re-emerge. In this regard, it is important 
to take account of the fact that each sovereign debt programme has a specific duration, and that overall 
the peak of EU sovereign debt activity has now passed, with only Greece still in a programme. In such 
a scenario, keeping legal spaces unresolved for long enough can have the practical effect of only 
proceeding to resolve legal questions after the access-to-justice and broader accountability utility of such 
                                                     
13 See for example the Collective Complaints, mainly from Greek union and pensioner organisations: European Committee of 
Social Rights, Complaint 65/2011 and Complaint 66/2011, Decisions of 23 May 2012; Complaints 76/2012, 77/2012, 
78/2012 and 79/2012, Decisions of 7 December 2012; Complaint 111/2014 pending. 
14 For example, ILO Committee on the Freedom of Association, Report on Greece (1–16 November 2012) paras 950–1003. 
15 For example, CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of Greece adopted by the Committee at its 
fifty fourth session (11 February – 1 March 2013). 
16 For example, Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concerning ‘the protection 
of the Covenant rights in the context of the economic and financial crisis’; UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner, Report on Austerity Measures and Economic and Social Rights (2013). 
17 For example, ‘Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis’, Issue Paper from Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights (2013). 
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resolution has largely passed. Two significant institutional practices emerge in this regard, one judicial 
and one executive, both explored further later in this analysis. The first concerns the Court of Justice’s 
management of cases. The sovereign debt judicial challenges were first dealt with by swift dispatch in 
the least prominent and reasoned kind of decision the Court of Justice can make. This was succeeded by 
placing a number of legal challenges on hold for more than twice as long as the average wait time for a 
pending case. The second concerns executive practices: the requirement to mirror euro area programmes 
with an EU-MAP from May 2013 has not been followed in the same way for all programme states with 
Greece subject to very different treatment from all other states. 
Pathways of law 
I proceed by exploring liminal legality through the lens of judicial challenges before the Court of Justice 
and then looking more closely at the position over time of the EU legislature and the EU Commission. 
There is a sense in which these too echo, in distinctive ways, the boundaries and temporal issues I 
suggest are central and captured by the term liminal legality.  
A significant body of challenges to these sources before the Court of Justice now exists, mainly asserting 
non-compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Two rather different groups of losers from 
the sovereign debt programmes brought cases before the Court of Justice: trade unions representing 
workers and pensioners challenging cuts and a worsening of their working conditions and ‘bailed-in’ 
depositors who lost their savings. In particular, we shall see three different EU judicial avenues used to 
challenge different components of the programmes: preliminary references on their validity, annulment 
actions and actions for damages against the European Commission. While clearly EU-based 
programmes were challenged only via preliminary references, programmes based primarily on 
international euro area agreements were never challenged via preliminary references but via annulment 
actions and actions for damages. Each of these judicial avenues and actions comes with their procedural 
constraints and possibilities which shape how the Court approaches the challenges. Hence the pathways 
of EU legal challenges create their own important boundaries and thresholds. One example is that an act 
of an EU institution can be challenged, regardless of its legal status, via one channel (preliminary 
reference) but not via others (annulment action or action for damages). A further relevant example is 
that an infringement of EU law by an EU institution may result in its annulment but not in founding an 
action for damages. Another pathway for law is legal reform. Yet we shall see that sovereign debt 
reforms either did not play out in the way the law states or as the law reform announcements promised.  
While no challenge to a sovereign debt programme condition has been successful, the reasoning and the 
reasons for failure allow us to assess the dynamics of liminal legality. The jurisprudence highlights the 
legal difficulties the sources themselves present across the key dimensions we have identified: law’s 
boundaries, times and pathways. As noted earlier the liminal legality issues arising differ for EU-based 
programmes and non-EU based programmes and I divide the analysis accordingly. My goals in this 
analysis are to evidence problematic legality boundaries and explore how and when the Court of Justice 
and other EU institutions assisted or failed to assist those affected by programmes to navigate the 
law/non-law and EU/non-EU law boundaries. I do not explore why the EU institutions acted as they did. 
How liminal legality compares with other analyses of legality and sovereign debt 
The problematic legality features explored here have been the focus of limited attention in legal analysis 
of the sovereign debt programmes. While the euro-crisis more broadly has been the object of extensive 
policy and scholarly analysis across a range of disciplines, the legal analysis has focused more on issues 
of transformation of the European economic ‘constitution’ or on particular high-profile constitutional 
encounters and issues before the Court of Justice, exemplified by the challenge to the legality of the 
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ESM in Pringle18 or the legality of the ECB’s Outright Market Transactions programme in Gauweiler19 
concerning the compatibility of these mechanisms and programmes with EMU law.20 My focus instead 
is less on constitutional and EMU-compatibility issues raised by euro-crisis law and more on legal issues 
raised by the nature of the programmes themselves and legal challenges to the conditionality contained 
in those programmes.  
The approach developed here can also usefully be distinguished from the response to a series of recent 
and high-profile (Grand Chamber) judgments by the Court of Justice in 2016 and 2017 on legal 
challenges to the sovereign debt programmes which we shall examine in this analysis. These have begun 
to result in mainly doctrinally oriented analysis and evaluation of those decisions.21 Yet such analyses, 
while critical of aspects of the judgments, tend to see these judgments as a significant step forward in 
opening the door to legal challenges and resolving the legal status of sovereign debt programmes. By 
stressing the temporal dimensions of liminal legality and the importance of viewing law as a practical 
enterprise, my analysis suggests that a narrowly doctrinal approach does not capture the problematic 
dimensions of legality in the EU sovereign debt programmes. While doctrinal approaches focus on 
‘until’, ‘once’ and ‘how’ the legal position is clarified, even in part, my analysis looks at how those 
processes go backwards as well as forwards and stresses that even clarifications are partial and may 
come too late to fulfil purposes other than doctrinal clarification.  
Finally, liminal legality has a number of distinct benefits over other ways of assessing the legality and 
institutional issues these sources raise.22 It lends itself to paying attention to the matrix of sources 
producing these uncertain legal statuses and how they play out institutionally over time. 
The pathways of legal challenge before the CJEU 
Court of Justice and EU programmes 
There have been a good number of preliminary references from Romanian and Portuguese courts on 
EU-based programmes.23 These are all references arising from challenges by unions and pensioner 
                                                     
18 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. 
19 Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
20 For an overview of the legal scholarship see Thomas Beukers, Bruno De Witte and Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Constitutional Change 
Through Euro-Crisis Law: Taking Stock, New Perspectives and Looking Ahead’ in Thomas Beukers, Bruno De Witte and 
Claire Kilpatrick (eds), Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law (CUP 2017). 
21 See the analyses of Ledra Advertising: Anastasia Poulou, ‘The Liability of the EU in the ESM framework’ 24 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2017) 127-39; Paul Dermine, ‘The End of Impunity? The Legal Duties of 
“Borrowed” EU Institutions under the European Stability Mechanism’ 13 EuConst (2017) 369-82. 
22 It differs from critical Rule of Law and abnormal source/institutional action analysis I have previously carried out in focusing 
less on the shortcomings of the sources from these perspectives (eg non-public promulgation, complexity, accessibility, 
difficulties of judicial challenge, incompatible institutional mandates): see Claire Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and 
Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’ 35 OJLS (2015) 325 and Claire 
Kilpatrick, ‘Abnormal Sources and Institutional Actions in the EU Sovereign Debt Crisis: ECB crisis management and the 
sovereign debt loans’ in Marise Cremona and Claire Kilpatrick (eds), EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations 
(OUP forthcoming). It also differs from earlier analysis I carried out to argue that in many important respects the sovereign 
debt programmes were straightforwardly subject to EU law. That was an analysis intended to bring the most EU legal 
clarity possible in light of over-stated institutional and scholarly assertions and assumptions that all the sovereign debt 
programmes were beyond EU law: Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailout measures immune to EU Social challenge because 
they are not EU Law?’ (2014) 10 EuConst 393. Here I am interested more in the construction and dynamics of the spaces 
of unclear legality created by the design of EU sovereign debt programmes.  
23 Challenges came only from Romanian and Portuguese courts: Case C-434/11 Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, Order [2011] 
ECR I-00196; Case C-134/12 Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, Order [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:288; Case C-462/11 Cozman, 
[2011] ECR I-00197; Case C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and others v BPN, Order [2013] 
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organizations on the EU Charter compatibility of pay and pension cuts and limitations with various 
Charter provisions: the right to property in Article 17 or Article 28 on collective bargaining or the 
requirement to protect a worker’s dignity in Article 31. 
What these show is that even when a programme is fully embedded in EU law, the mere fact of being 
in a programme and the MoU as an elusive source creates liminal legality. Many courts in these states 
did not make preliminary references on the validity of the MoU in part at least because they could not 
make sense of the sources.24 The references that were made did not closely cite the relevant EU sources. 
But note also that the Court of Justice did not help them. In the first six of these references, between 
2011 and 2014, it rejected them in summary fashion by Order, with no Advocate General Opinion. It 
said that as the referring courts provided no elements from which it could be considered that the 
contested national provision implemented EU law, as required under Article 51(1) EUCFR, the Court 
had no competence to decide the reference. These references were halted long before approaching 
questions concerning the legal status of MoU’s and the applicability of fundamental rights in EU-based 
sovereign debt programmes. The Court of Justice failed to grant them the treatment it has applied in 
comparable references where it offered a creative reformulation of the questions referred in order to 
make them admissible.  
Hence, in the first phase of its case-law, while many programmes were in progress, the Court of Justice 
failed to take steps to address the programmes’ liminal legality through its admissibility approach. These 
cases were managed firmly under the radar; dispatched with the most minimal reasoning by Order with 
no Opinion from an Advocate General. Although these cases spanned a period of three years, there was 
no sign of institutional adjustment by the Court of Justice. The Court spurned a series of opportunities 
to clarify the legal status of the MoU and how the Charter applied to the programmes. 
In a second phase, however, a Romanian reference, Florescu,25 and a recently referred pending 
Portuguese reference have been treated differently by the Court of Justice. In Florescu, this may be 
because the national court, perhaps learning from earlier failures, sent a more precise and wide-ranging 
reference concerning the legal status of the MoU and of specific provisions being challenged. Those 
provisions concerned new requirements precluding those working in public institutions from receiving 
vested pensions if they were still in employment and the pension exceeded gross average national 
salary.26 The applicants were former judges still teaching law at universities who were not paid their 
judicial pensions as a result. The referring court asked whether such requirements complied with a range 
of EU law provisions, including Article 6 TEU, a range of Charter provisions (the right to property in 
                                                     
ECLI:EU:C:2013:149; Case C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial – 
Companhia de Seguros, SA , Order [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036; Case C-665/13 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais 
de Seguros e Afins v Via Directa - Companhia de Seguros, SA, [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2327; Case C-262/14 SMCD 
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:336; Case C-258/14, Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448; 
Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:395, Opinion of 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe (judgment currently pending). 
24 For fuller analysis of the constitutional position in all sovereign debt states, with ample examples of this issue, see Thomas 
Beukers, Bruno De Witte and Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Constitutional Change Through Euro-Crisis Law: Taking Stock, New 
Perspectives and Looking Ahead’ in Thomas Beukers, Bruno De Witte and Claire Kilpatrick (eds), Constitutional Change 
Through Euro-Crisis Law (CUP 2017). 
25 Case C-258/14, Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:995. 
26 One earlier Romanian reference had focused on compatibility of a linked measure in the same 2009 Law with the age 
discrimination prohibition in Directive 2000/78: the measure automatically ended the employment relationship of those 
receiving pensions higher than average income if the affected individual had not opted to continue it within a prescribed 
period: Case C–264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial – Companhia de 
Seguros, SA , Order [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036. This was decided by Chamber judgment in July 2015 without an AG 
Opinion. It was relied upon by the AG in Case C-258/14, Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:995, Opinion of AG Bot, to dismiss the age discrimination challenge on the basis that this is not age-
based discrimination but based on the status of being a public sector employee with a pension higher than national gross 
average salary.  
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Article 17, to equality and non-discrimination in Articles 20 and 21 and the right to effective judicial 
protection in Article 47) as well as the principle of legal certainty and the Framework Equal Treatment 
Directive. It is the first EU-based sovereign debt programme to be the subject of an AG Opinion, in 
December 2016, and a judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 13 June 2017. This 
reference illustrates the important temporal dimension to the Court’s management of fundamental rights 
challenges to sovereign debt conditions in that over three years elapsed between the referral and the 
ruling (when the average time for deciding a preliminary reference is currently fifteen months).  
As for the unclear legal boundaries, for EU programmes, for the reasons set out earlier, the main 
clarification required was the status of an MoU. The Advocate General (Bot) in Florescu was Janus-
faced in his approach to the legal construction of an MoU in an EU-based programme. The first half of 
his Opinion points to the MoU being non-challengeable because it is non-binding and not tightly enough 
related to the challenged measure. He considered that such an MoU was an act of the EU institutions, a 
position that was hard to avoid for the non-euro area programmes for the reasons set out earlier. 
However, and crucially, he accepted without reasoned argument the Commission’s view that the MoU 
‘does not produce binding legal effects’.27 This meant the MoU was placed by the Advocate General on 
the non-law side of the law/non-law divide. In any event, the Advocate General continued, the MoU did 
not require Romania to adopt the pension measure. While making other more precise measures 
conditions for loan assistance and requiring pensions’ reform and fiscal consolidation, it did not 
specifically require the prohibition of combining public service pension with employment income above 
a fixed level. While this is the case for this particular measure, it is worth noting that this is far from 
typical, especially in the ongoing revised MoUs addressed to Romania throughout the programme.  
However, in the second half of the Opinion, the AG went in a very different and not easily coherent 
direction with the first half. He considered that although the pension measure itself was not directly 
required by EU law, the national Act of Parliament containing it was clearly in terms entirely aimed at 
fulfilling the requirements for obtaining EU sovereign debt loan assistance under the terms of the MoU. 
The latter was now considered to be ‘part of EU law’ given that it ‘gives concrete form to the procedure 
arising under Article 143 TFEU. On that basis […] Council Decision 2009/459 was adopted which 
provides that the disbursement of each further instalment of financial assistance is to be made when the 
implementation of the new economic programme of the Romanian Government, the conditions of which 
are laid down in that Memorandum of Understanding’. Hence, the Advocate General considered the 
entire piece of national legislation should be considered as ‘an implementation of EU law’ for the 
purposes of Article 51 EUCFR. The discretion given to Romania by the MoU was circumscribed so that 
the objectives referred to in the Council Decision and the MoU were ‘sufficiently detailed and precise 
to constitute a specific rule of EU law’.28 
                                                     
27 Florescu, Opinion of AG Bot, para 53: ‘Admittedly, as the Commission pointed out at the hearing, the Memorandum of 
Understanding does not produce binding legal effects’. While this would be fatal for an annulment action, it did not prevent 
a preliminary reference as these can be made in relation to any acts of EU institutions including non-binding legal acts. 
28 Florescu, Opinion of AG Bot, para 70. As for substantive infringement of the Charter, the Advocate General would not 
consider Articles 20 and 21 on equality and non-discrimination as he considered that the national court had not explained 
how the pension measure could infringe those articles. As a result he addressed only the Article 17 right to property. 
Drawing extensively and exclusively on Strasbourg case-law, he found that the measure did not deprive the pensioners of 
their property right as they could opt to stop work. It therefore only restricted the right to property (the contributory pension) 
and this could be permitted if ‘regulated by law in so far as necessary for the general interest’. Meeting MoU obligations 
and reducing the effects of the economic crisis was certainly (‘it does not seem open to debate’) an objective of general 
interest. It also met the requirement of necessity as in this very particular context the Member States and the EU institutions 
were best placed to decide on the appropriate measures and also did not place an excessive burden on the individuals as 
they will get their pension once they stop work, which they can opt to do at any time, and meanwhile continue to receive 
income from employment. Therefore the measure was not precluded by the right to property in the EU Charter. 
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The judgment of the Court of Justice found the MoU to be ‘mandatory’ but not specific enough to have 
required the Romanian vested pension rule.29 However, because of the broad sphere of Charter 
application it had established in earlier cases whereby an implementation of EU law can occur in a wide 
range of circumstances, including where the national legislature has substantial discretion, the Court 
proceeded to examine whether there had been a breach of the right to property in Article 17 of the 
Charter. It concluded there was not as, on the one hand, the cuts served the general interests and, on the 
other, the individuals affected could choose at any time to stop work and receive their pension.  
A subsequent and still pending Portuguese reference30 concerns judges from the domestic Court of 
Auditors whose trade union argued that pay-cuts breached the principle of judicial independence 
safeguarded in Art 19(1) TEU and Art 47 EUCFR. Although this is a short and poorly drafted reference31 
it is treated differently from the first wave of references.32  This is the first time an Advocate General 
focuses on a mixed EU/international law programme. Unlike the previous references, it was processed 
speedily, with the AG Opinion delivered three months after referral. He considered questions about the 
status of an Excessive Deficit Recommendation as well as the Council Implementing Decisions which 
formed part of the chain of sources for the EFSM-based programmes. He argued that an Excessive 
Deficit Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU was not an implementation of EU law for the 
purposes of Charter application but the Council Implementing Decision under the EFSM granting loan 
assistance could be (with some hesitation based on the clarity of the national decision accompanying the 
reference in relation to the latter as it did not reference the CID applicable at the time of the dispute but 
an earlier one). He considered no breach of the principle of judicial independence had taken place. 
Challenging the euro area programmes before the Court of Justice 
Annulment Actions 
The EU annulment action makes it easy for States and EU institutions to mount fundamental rights 
challenges to EU acts - as privileged applicants they need only meet a two-month time-limit for 
instituting proceedings. However, it is not easy to imagine either a Member State or an EU institution 
taking an annulment action against the programmes. Again, the liminal legality of the programmes in 
the eyes of the main EU institution not driving the programmes, the European Parliament, is an important 
element to bear in mind.33 
                                                     
29 Case C-258/14, Florescu v Casa Judeţeană de Pensii Sibiu, [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:448, para 41 ‘..the Memorandum of 
Understanding, although mandatory, contains no specific provision requiring the adoption of the national legislation at 
issue in the main proceedings’. 
30 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas. 
31 The full reference asks, ‘In view of the mandatory requirements of eliminating the excessive budget deficit and of financial 
assistance regulated by EU rules, must the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of 
Article 19(1) TEU, in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  and in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice, be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the measures to reduce remuneration that are applied to the 
judiciary in Portugal, where they are imposed unilaterally and on an ongoing basis by other constitutional authorities and 
bodies, as is the consequence of Article 2 of Law No 75/2014 of 12 September?’ However, the AG gleans more relevant 
details from the judgment of the referring court. 
32 The AG argued the Court should consider itself competent to consider the reference as, comparatively, the referring court 
‘has supplied more explicit, albeit relatively summary, information as to the existence of such an implementation of EU 
law in the present case’. See Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:395, Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, para 45. 
33 Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area 
programme countries (EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 28 February 2014). See paras 59-60 (political 
rather than legal responsibility of the Eurogroup at core of bailouts) and para 32 where the EP ‘regrets the inclusion in the 
programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal of a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and 
expenditure cuts; regrets the fact that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Claire Kilpatrick 
12 Department of Law Working Papers 
Everyone else (the non-privileged applicants) needs additionally to be able to establish direct and 
individual concern: ‘Any natural or legal person may…institute proceedings against an act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them’ (Article 263(4) TFEU). It is clear that 
the annulment action can only be used to challenge legal acts of the EU. That means the challenge must 
focus on using one of the three paths identified above (see Figure 1) linking the euro area programmes 
to EU law and institutions to find an EU legal act which can be challenged for its fundamental rights’ 
compatibility. Annulment actions based on EU fundamental rights were taken by two rather different 
groups of programme ‘losers’: unions and their members challenging measures negatively affecting pay 
and working conditions and bank depositors whose savings were taken to recapitalise Cypriot banks. 34 
Both actions were clearly required in the MoUs addressed to Greece and Cyprus. 
In ADEDY the Greek civil servants’ confederation challenged the validity of the Excessive Deficit 
Decision of May 2010 for its effects on income and working conditions. They lost because they were 
found not to be directly concerned by the EU measure. Take for instance their challenge to this: ‘Greece 
shall adopt …before the end of June 2010…a reduction of the Easter, summer and Christmas bonuses 
paid to civil servants with the aim of saving EUR 1500 million for a full year’. The General Court found 
they were not directly concerned because the measure did not directly affect their legal (but only their 
factual) situation and it also left discretion in its application to the person to whom it is addressed (here 
Greece). 35  The General Court said nothing about whether an Excessive Deficit Decision provided a 
basis for challenging a loan condition. 
In 2016, the Court of Justice on appeal from the General Court, rejected two annulment actions from 
depositors in Cyprus.36 Depositors with over 100000 euros were bailed-in and saw their savings turned 
into securities resulting in a loss. They argued this breached their right to property in Article 17(1) EU 
Charter. 
The depositor bail-in was in the draft memorandum negotiated with the Commission in March 2013. It 
was approved by the Euro-group (ie the finance ministers of the euro states) in a March statement, 
carried out in late March, and included in the final MoU approved by the ESM in April 2013. 
The depositors failed in three different ways to find a legal act by an EU institution which could be the 
object of an annulment action: 
1. The relevant parts of the MoU could not be annulled as this was an act of the ESM and hence 
outside the EU legal order; 
2. The Eurogroup statement preceding the MoU could not be the subject of an annulment action as 
it was (i) not a legal act but a political agreement and (ii) the Eurogroup was not a formal EU 
Council configuration or a body, agency or office of the Union; 
3. The Commission and the ECB could not be seen as the real authors of the MoU or Euro-group 
statement as these institutions have no decision-making powers of their own in the ESM 
structure. 
                                                     
Union or by the provisions of the Treaties, notably Article 168(7)TFEU’. See:                    
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/subject-files.html?id=20140114CDT77307 
34 T-541/10 and T-215/11, ADEDY and others v Council supported by the Commission, Orders of the General Court 2012 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:626 & ECLI:EU:T:2012:627; Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P Mallis v Commission and ECB 
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:702; Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. 
35 It is also worth noting that the Court refused to adjust its direct concern jurisprudence to proceed to examine the substance 
on the basis of arguments by the Greek union that the measures challenged raised issues so grave that they risked 
undermining the confidence of EU citizens in EU institutions. 
36 A number of other depositor bail-in cases are pending before the General Court such as: T-149/14 Anastasiou v Commission 
and ECB; T-495/14 Theodorakis and Theodoraki v Council; T-786/14 Bourdouvali v Council; T-161/15 Brinkmann (Steel 
Trading) v Commission and ECB. 
The EU and its sovereign debt programmes: The challenges of liminal legality 
European University Institute 13 
It is the cumulative and sequential features of this jurisprudence against our knowledge of the sovereign 
debt measures that place these judgments in their appropriate context for evaluation. We know that there 
was an EU legal act, the Excessive Deficit Decision addressed to Cyprus when its programme was 
adopted (the EU-MAP under the 2-Pack was adopted only later). In Ledra Advertising and Mallis, the 
Cyprus depositors lost not because of the absence of an EU legal act but rather because of the failure, 
by the litigants and by the Court, to identify such an EU legal act although one contender clearly existed. 
Moreover, the failure by the Court in ADEDY to clarify the connection between the Excessive Deficit 
Decision and the MoU feeds into this failure. And, unlike the union and workers in ADEDY, the Cyprus 
bank depositors actually might have belonged to the exceptional category of individuals able to meet 
the requirements of being individually and directly concerned.37 
This makes the sequencing of the Court’s reasoning in the cases worthy of more searching scrutiny. Had 
the Court examined direct and individual concern in Ledra and Mallis, it would, even if it had retained 
its incomplete reasoning on the existence of an EU legal act, have created an important advance in 
clarifying the status of individuals wishing to judicially review programme measures. Had the Court 
examined whether the Excessive Deficit Decision was an EU legal act embodying the MoU in ADEDY, 
rather than confining itself to the issue of direct concern, it would have laid the ground for a fuller and 
more persuasive set of EU law arguments in Ledra and Mallis.38 The extreme parsimony of the Court’s 
reasoning, in particular that an EU law source not raised by the parties in the case before the Court will 
not be considered, is noteworthy. Certainly the Court of Justice, in making its choices, did not assist the 
applicants in navigating the crucial and difficult EU law/non-EU law boundary. 
Action for damages 
In Ledra39 the Court took its first step towards linking the EU with the euro area programmes. 
Disagreeing with the General Court and the AG it found that an action for damages could be taken by 
the depositors against the Commission under Article 268 TFEU and Article 340 TFEU. This is on the 
basis that the Commission, as guardian of the EU Treaties, is required under EU law not to sign an MoU 
whose consistency with EU law it doubts. In particular, the Court confirmed that the Charter is addressed 
to EU institutions even when they act outside the EU legal framework. Unlike annulment actions, 
applicants have five years to bring an action from when the event triggering liability occurred, although 
in most programme states this time has already passed. However, there are multiple complex cumulative 
hurdles in the EU action for damages. The applicants fell at the need to show a breach of a rule of law 
intended to confer rights upon the individual. There was none here as any restriction on the depositors’ 
                                                     
37 There is a good case that the depositors were individually concerned as no-one else could even potentially join the class of 
those whose deposits were bailed in by the Bank of Cyprus; the class was closed in theory and closed in fact on the date 
the bail-in occurred. As for direct concern, the Court accepts that the action affected their property rights and accordingly 
their legal position. The main stumbling block is whether Cyprus had any discretion in deciding on which depositors to 
bail in. While the Cypriot government originally aimed to also bail-in secured depositors (those with deposits under 100000 
euros) protected under EU law, which position was rejected by the Cypriot Parliament, at no stage were unsecured 
depositors not included in the set of persons to be bailed-in. That suggests an absence of discretion by Cyprus and its 
Central Bank in bailing-in the unsecured depositors. AG Wathelet in Mallis asserted that the depositors would not be 
individually concerned but without providing any reasons. See Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P Mallis v 
Commission and ECB [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:294, Opinion of AG Wathelet, footnote 35. 
38 Though even here questions remain open because of the many different stages under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Article 
126 TFEU sets out a long chain of steps to be taken before excessive deficit sanctions may be imposed on a Member State. 
In that chain under Article 126, Article 126(6) entails a Council Decision that an excessive deficit exists, Article 126(7) 
entails a Recommendation on how to address that deficit, Article 126(8) allows that Recommendation to be made public 
in the event of inadequate action while Article 126(9) is the beginning of legally binding measures against States with 
excessive deficits. The Cyprus Decision was under Article 126(6) TFEU while Greece’s was under Article 126(9) TFEU 
though both were also linked to Article 136 TFEU.  For the Advocate General in Tribunal de Contas, as noted above (n 
30), this is a legally relevant difference. 
39 Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising v Commission and ECB [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. 
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property rights was justified by the need to ensure the stability of the euro area banking system and 
prevent spillover to other sectors of the economy. It remains unclear if this will be the strongest bridge 
between EU law and the programmes and how robust it will turn out to be. However, a recent follow-
up concerning pension cuts indicates its fragility. 
Sotiropoulou40 concerned an action for damages in relation to Greek pension cuts where just under 1 
million euros of damages was claimed by 64 applicants on the basis inter alia of breach of Article 1 (the 
right to dignity), 25 (‘The Union recognises the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity and 
independence and to participate in social and cultural life’) and 34 (social security and assistance) of the 
EU Charter. The action was taken against the Council for its Excessive Deficit Decision accompanying 
the first Greek MoU. Again, like Florescu, the action was pending for much longer than average: 32 
months when the average time to deal with a case in 2016 by the General Court was just over 18 months. 
Unlike Ledra, it concerned the compatibility of social rights of worker/pensioners with the EU Charter. 
The disposal of cases through reliance on the limited protection of the right to property in Strasbourg 
case-law, relied upon in Ledra and Florescu, was accordingly not available. This action for damages 
failed because of how the General Court approached the need for the EU to have committed a sufficiently 
serious breach by manifestly and gravely disregarding the limits of its discretion, another standard 
element in establishing an EU action for damages. Because of the deterioration of the public finances in 
Greece, and its implications for euro area stability, detailed conditions were agreed in order to grant 
Greece loan assistance. It was therefore, the General Court found, not manifestly unjustified to cut 
pensions and the Council, in adopting the challenged Excessive Deficit Decisions, had not disregarded 
the limits of its discretion. Even if the substance of the rights to social security and assistance had to be 
examined, which was not the case, those were not absolute rights and had rightly been restricted to 
pursue objectives of general interest.  
Now it does seem striking that almost a decade into the sovereign debt programmes, and following 
multiple challenges, not only has no one won a claim but we still have limited answers to many of the 
issues identified as constituting liminal legality in the boundary sense in the programmes.41 From mid-
June 2017, we know from Florescu that EU-based MoUs can be considered binding, though this comes 
six years after the end of the most recent EU-based programme. We do not know the legal meaning for 
validity actions to be given to the links between the MoU and Excessive Deficit Decisions or the EU-
MAPs. We do know that the four AG Opinions of the last few months of 2016 in Florescu, Ledra and 
Mallis and of 2017 in the Tribunal de Contas case took radically different positions. A first AG fully 
resisted any contact between the programmes and EU law or institutional responsibility. AG Wahl in 
Ledra argued that the programmes have nothing to do with EU law. In his opinion fundamental rights 
challenges must be dealt with only as a matter of international law and EU law challenges are an attempt 
to circumvent that. A second, AG Wathelet in Mallis, embraced the link between EU law and the euro 
area sovereign debt programmes he found in the parallel EU law sources identified in Figure 1: the 
Excessive Deficit Decisions and the EU-MAP. Moreover, he does not distinguish between the legal 
relevance of the different decision steps in the Excessive Deficit Procedure under Article 126 TFEU. 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in the Tribunal de Contas reference, by contrast, rejected the Excessive Deficit 
link where it consists only of a Decision that a deficit exists (under Article 126(6) TFEU followed by a 
Recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU). AG Bot in Florescu is, as already noted, Janus-faced on 
the status of an EU-MoU. The range of views itself demonstrates the central and enduring feature of 
liminal legality. The Court of Justice was bolder than the General Court or the Advocate General in 
Ledra in finding the Commission is required to observe compliance with commitments across EU law, 
                                                     
40 T-531/14 Sotiropoulou v Council [2017] ECLI:EU:T:2017:297. 
41 This can be fruitfully contrasted with the timing and case management of those cases challenging primarily the EMU 
compatibility of sovereign debt funds or ECB actions. Pringle (n 18) was decided by the Full Court (a treatment accorded 
to a few cases each year), and by accelerated procedure, so that it was referred on 31 July 2012 and decided by the CJEU 
on 27 November 2012. Gauweiler (n 19) was referred in January 2014 by the German Constitutional Court and decided in 
June 2015 by Grand Chamber. 
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not simply economic policy co-ordination, in its MoU roles. This is certainly its only significant step so 
far towards taking legal cognisance of EU centrality in sovereign debt programme. Its contribution to 
resolving liminal legality is important but partial. Most significantly, time is as significant a dimension 
as substance. There is a real sense in which legality delayed is legality denied.  
The recent crop of decisions in 2016 and 2017 do, nonetheless, give some sense of what EU fundamental 
rights protection lies behind the obstacles presented by liminal legality. They show that there is little to 
be gained from inventive and thoughtful legal arguments linking sovereign debt conditions with EU 
law; one set of obstacles will simply give way to another in which the rights in the Charter, related to 
social and acquired monetary rights protection, are all rightly restricted by the public interest in euro 
area stability42 or, outside the euro area, to rationalize public spending in an exceptional context of global 
financial and economic crisis.43 
The pathways of law reform 
In the programme sources themselves: Greeks beware! 
The most prominent step towards both legal clarity and fundamental rights commitments in sovereign 
debt programmes was undoubtedly the introduction of the requirement from May 2013 (in the Two-
Pack) for each programme to be mirrored in an EU-law based Macro-economic Adjustment Programme 
(EU-MAP). The EU-MAP Regulation links itself to a range of social constitutional and rights 
commitments in primary EU law. Hence its Preamble references Article 9 TFEU, the mainstreaming 
social clause introduced by the Lisbon Treaty,44 and states that social partners and civil society 
organisations should be involved in programmes. Moreover the Regulation requires each EU-MAP to 
fully observe collective labour rights, both Article 152 TFEU45 and Article 28 EU Charter, as well as 
requiring budgetary consolidation efforts to take into account ‘the need to ensure sufficient means for 
fundamental policies, such as education and health care’.46 
We have seen that no cases brought to the Court of Justice so far have concerned a state covered by an 
EU-MAP so they have not served as a way of judicially challenging fundamental rights compliance. 
None the less, the EU-MAP could be seen as a significant step forward towards reducing liminal legality 
and embedding commitments to fundamental rights. The Council Implementing Decisions adopting the 
EU-MAPs for Cyprus and for Greece indeed refer to involving the social partners and to the programmes 
promoting ‘growth, employment and social fairness’ as well the financial stability and the sustainability 
of public finances. 
However, the actual unfolding of the EU-MAPs tells a different story, raising further questions about 
the commitment of the EU to legality and fundamental rights in its programmes. One might expect 
                                                     
42 Ledra ( n 38) para 69, Sotiropoulou (n 40) paras 88-90. 
43 Florescu (n 25) paras 56–58. 
44 Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that, in defining and implementing its 
policies and activities, the Union is to take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, 
the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health. 
45 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202/47 
 ‘The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national 
systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.’ 
46 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391 Article 7(2) and (6); Regulation (EU) 
472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability [2013] OJ L 140/1. 
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programme states to be treated similarly, and according to the requirements laid down once the 
requirement to have an EU-MAP came into effect in May 2013. And indeed for Cyprus (and Portugal 
and Ireland before that), the EU-MAP works as its parent Regulation says it should. The first EU-MAP 
for Cyprus was created in September 2013 and was after that date regularly amended to reflect the 
changing MoUs addressed to Cyprus. A strong continuity between the Cyprus Excessive Deficit 
Decision and the EU-MAP was forged by repealing the former when the latter was introduced.47 In the 
words of the EU-MAP Decision for Cyprus this was done ‘for reasons of legal clarity and legal 
certainty’. 
Contrast this with Greece. The EU-MAP for Greece, undoubtedly the most important given the special 
difficulties with the EU law status of the Greek bailout and its size, conditionality, scope and duration, 
was not made until 19 August 2015, well over 2 years after the ‘requirement’ in the Two-Pack to have 
such a Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme took effect. No less importantly, the EU-MAP has never 
been updated to reflect the important changes from August 2015 in the Greek programme such as the 
substantial Supplemental MoU of July 2016.  
The contrasts continue. Unlike Cyprus, the EU-MAP for Greece of August 201548 and the Excessive 
Deficit Decision of August 2015 continue to co-exist. Moreover, the Excessive Deficit Decision 
preceding that of 2015 is from December 2012, leaving a parallel EU law ‘gap’ of two and a half years 
for the Greek programmes. Hence for Greece EU institutional and legislative practice continues to push 
away from EU legality and towards liminality. Challenges to Greek programme measures are on shakier 
legal ground than the evolving legal sources might have led one to believe.  
The reform proposals of the Juncker Commission 
Institutional shifts in Social Europe via EMU, especially in the new European Commission, are 
important to trace. As Commission President-elect, in July 2014 Juncker presented 10 policy areas for 
his mandate to the European Parliament. Under the policy heading, ‘A Deeper and Fairer Monetary 
Union’ the Social Europe emphasis went on containing the excesses and mistakes of the sovereign debt 
programmes. Comparing the crisis measures to ‘repairing a burning plane while flying’, Juncker 
accepted that mistakes were made, namely, ‘There was a lack of social fairness. Democratic legitimacy 
suffered as many new instruments had to be created outside the legal framework of the European Union’. 
He committed to a medium-term goal of social impact assessment for programmes and replacement of 
the troika with a more ‘democratically legitimate and more accountable structure, based around 
European institutions with enhanced Parliamentary control both at European and at national level’. Mr 
Juncker in his first State of the Union speech to the European Parliament in September 2015 announced 
the launch of development of a new European Pillar of Social Rights as part of ‘A new start for Greece, 
for the euro area and the European economy’. 
Again, however, the headline differs from the content. In fact, the opportunity to test this more social 
vision of sovereign debt programmes came soon after with the agreement of the third Greek programme 
in August 2015. For the first time, a sovereign debt programme was subjected to a social impact 
assessment.49 This assessment is however better characterised as a Commission defence, using figures 
or estimates on distributive effects, of the Greek programmes from 2010.  
The European Pillar of Social Rights was the subject of a year-long extensive consultation process, from 
March 2016 to March 2017, the results of which were announced by the Commission on 26 April 2017. 
                                                     
47 The Excessive Deficit Decisions for Cyprus and Greece only acknowledge the need to ‘minimize any negative social impact’.  
48 Council Implementing Decision 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macro-economic adjustment programme for 
Greece [2015] OJ L 219/12. 
49 Commission Staff Working Document, Assessment of the Social Impact of the new Stability Support Programme for Greece, 
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Despite its focus on social rights in the euro area, and its genesis in the legitimacy issues raised most 
sharply by EU sovereign debt programmes, the consultation and its outcomes shows that the European 
Pillar of Social Rights is not at all targeted at embedding sovereign debt programmes within EU law and 
fundamental rights’ commitments. It is rather about proclaiming an attachment in the normal run of 
economic policy co-ordination, especially in the euro area, to social commitments.50     
Conclusion: the EU as Macavity 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the EU, in the sovereign debt programmes, is like Macavity 
the mystery cat. While its paws are everywhere, a reason can always be found why it’s never found at 
the scene of any particular programme or programme condition or, if it exceptionally is, has not done 
anything wrong.  And, most importantly, this is not just a feature of the first wave of the crisis but an 
ongoing feature which is particularly marked in the successive Greek programmes. That is one reason 
why keeping a close eye on what happened and how the Court of Justice and the other EU institutions 
manage these sources is important. Limited, inconsistently applied and sometimes purely cosmetic 
moves have been taken to addressing the legality and fundamental rights issues the programmes raise. 
Liminal legality is a productive lens through which to examine these phenomena. It focuses attention on 
the legal boundaries across which sources find themselves situated. It stresses the importance of the 
duration and re-emergence of uncertainty for legality particularly with regard to sources with a limited 
period of application. It shows how the pathways of EU law interact with these threshold dimensions in 
important ways. 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 Communication from the Commission Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights, COM (2017) 250 final (26 April 
2017).  
  
 
